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Data and Decentralization: Measuring the 
Performance of Legal Institutions in 
Multilevel Systems of Governance 
Kevin E. Davis† 
  INTRODUCTION   
In the waning days of Barack Obama’s presidency, his oppo-
nents took every possible opportunity to criticize his perfor-
mance. One of the more interesting attacks condemned the 
Obama Administration for allowing the United States to drop in 
the World Bank’s Doing Business rankings. A columnist at the 
Wall Street Journal lamented that after President Obama took 
office the United States fell from third to eighth place in the over-
all rankings.1 He went on to complain, “Eight years ago, 40 days 
were needed to get a construction permit. Now it’s 81. When 
President Bush left office, it took 300 days to enforce a contract. 
Today: 420. As for registering property, the cost has nearly quin-
tupled since 2009, to 2.4% of property value from 0.5%.”2 
The World Bank’s Doing Business indicators have many vir-
tues, but they clearly are not good measures of the performance 
of the U.S. federal government, regardless of who is president. 
This is because the United States has a multilevel system of gov-
ernance of which the President forms only a part, and the Doing 
Business indicators mainly capture the performance of other 
parts of the system. Specifically, the Doing Business indicators 
 
†  New York University School of Law. Email: ked2@nyu.edu. I am grate-
ful to participants in the conference on Decentralization and Development for 
helpful comments, to Fernando Delgado, Martin Sybblis and Mae Nguyen for 
helpful conversations, to Ava Haghighi and Rodrigo Mella for research assis-
tance, and to the Filomen D’Agostino and Max E. Greenberg Research Fund for 
financial support. Copyright © 2018 by Kevin E. Davis. 
 1. Bret Stephens, Doomed to Stagnate?, WALL ST. J., Dec. 20, 2016, at A21. 
 2. Id. 
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are based on data from one or two of each country’s largest busi-
ness cities.3 In the case of the United States, two cities are used: 
New York City and Los Angeles.4 The President of the United 
States is responsible for many things, but he does not control 
how long it takes to get a construction permit in New York City 
or Los Angeles. Nor does the President control how much it costs 
to register property in either of those cities, or how long it takes 
to enforce a contract in either the New York Supreme Court or 
the Superior Court of California. Construction permits are the 
responsibility of the respective city governments. Enforcing con-
tracts is the responsibility of the courts. As for the cost of regis-
tering property, in New York City that depends on fees, taxes, 
and charges set by three different levels of government: the 
county, city, and state.5 Of the ten country-level indicators pro-
duced by the Doing Business project, only three relate to matters 
mainly controlled by the federal government of the United 
States: paying taxes, trading across borders, and resolving insol-
vency.6 Of these three, the paying taxes indicator still is not fully 
controlled by the federal government as it encompasses payment 
of city, state, and federal taxes.7 
Although the Doing Business indicators do not fit the part, 
measures that accurately capture the performance of individual 
governmental units within a multilevel system of governance 
play critically important roles in holding those units accountable 
and, ultimately, maintaining and enhancing their performance. 
Without accurate performance measures, it is difficult for stake-
holders to claim with authority that any individual governmen-
tal unit, or even a class of units, is in need of reform or replace-
ment. This applies to internal as well as external actors—if they 
do not know how well they are doing, then even the most highly 
motivated government officials will have no rational basis for de-
ciding how to do their jobs better. 
 
 3. WORLD BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS 2017: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR 
ALL 13 (2017), http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/ 
Documents/Annual-Reports/English/DB17-Report.pdf.  
 4. Id. at 163. 
 5. WORLD BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS 2017: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR 
ALL, ECONOMY PROFILE 2017 UNITED STATES 34–45, 65–68, 103 (2017) (show-
ing data on processes for construction permits, registering property, and enforc-
ing contracts), https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/ 
25643/WP-DB17-PUBLIC-United-States.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
 6. See id. at 86–99, 109–15. 
 7. Id. at 90–92. 
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Measures of the performance of legal institutions—namely, 
institutions involved in promulgating and administering 
norms—within multilevel systems of governance are especially 
important. But, for the reasons set out below, accurate measures 
may not be easy to find. This is particularly true of legal institu-
tions situated at the lower levels of hierarchical systems, far re-
moved from the national legislatures and constitutional courts 
that capture most of the attention directed toward legal sys-
tems.8  
Two factors are likely to limit the availability of perfor-
mance measures for legal institutions. First, it is difficult to dis-
tinguish the influence of low-level legal institutions from that of 
institutions at other levels of governance. Second, market forces 
will not necessarily prompt anyone to go through the trouble of 
producing measures that isolate the performance of these insti-
tutions. The costs of producing disaggregated measures may be 
as high as, or higher than, the costs of producing more highly 
aggregated measures, and the demand for the more precise 
measures is typically more limited. 
If these claims are right, there are important drawbacks to 
certain forms of multilevel governance and legal decentraliza-
tion. Many justifications for multilevel governance assume that 
it is possible for various kinds of stakeholders to measure the 
performance of individual governmental units, whether those 
stakeholders are voters, potential residents, potential investors, 
officials in higher levels of government, or members of govern-
ment officials’ professional networks. Without access to ade-
quate performance measures, none of those stakeholders will be 
in a position to exert a positive influence on government officials. 
The academic literature on decentralization in governance has 
paid considerable attention to other factors that might limit the 
accountability of lower levels of government in multilevel sys-
tems of governance.9 However, relatively little attention has 
been paid to either the availability of performance measures or 
issues specific to legal institutions. There is also extensive liter-
ature on the challenges inherent in producing performance 
measures for legal institutions, but to date that literature has 
 
 8. For a notable exception, see Todd Mitton, The Wealth of Subnations: 
Geography, Institutions, and Within-Country Development, 118 J. DEV. 
ECON. 88 (2016) (studying data covering subnational regions from 101 coun-
tries). 
 9. See generally Dilip Mookherjee, Political Decentralization, 7 ANN. REV. 
ECON. 231 (2015) (providing an overview of the literature on political decentral-
ization). 
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not focused on institutions at the lower levels of multilevel sys-
tems of governance.10 
The next part of this Article summarizes the standard rea-
sons for believing that people might use measures of the perfor-
mance of legal institutions to maintain and enhance the perfor-
mance of those institutions. Part II describes several existing 
performance measures. Part III explains why it can be difficult 
to produce suitable performance measures in complex multilevel 
systems of governance. Part IV discusses the reasons why profit-
oriented actors are unlikely to produce these sorts of measures 
and why support from not-for-profit or public agencies is likely 
to be required.  
I.  THE VALUE OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES FOR 
LEGAL INSTITUTIONS   
Most people in the world are subject to multiple levels of 
governance, by both governmental and nongovernmental actors. 
In China, for example, in addition to the national government, 
there are governments at the level of provinces, prefectures, 
counties, townships, and villages.11 In the European Union, in-
dividual member states typically have fewer levels of govern-
ment than in China, but there is also a supranational level of 
governance to consider.12 Virtually everywhere in the world, peo-
ple’s lives are influenced in material ways by the actions of in-
ternational organizations and foreign governments regulating 
extraterritorially.13 Organizations beyond the nation-state play 
a particularly important role in governance of smaller, poorer 
countries, especially those with limited internal capacity for gov-
ernance. Consider, for example, the role that the World Bank 
 
 10. See, e.g., Kevin E. Davis, Legal Indicators: The Power of Quantitative 
Measures of Law, 10 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 37 (2014) (discussing key issues 
related to legal indicators measuring aspects of a legal system). On the general 
importance of studying political phenomena at the appropriate geographic level, 
see Clark C. Gibson et al., The Concept off Scale and the Human Dimensions of 
Global Change: A Survey, 32 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 217, 233–36 (2000). 
 11. SEBASTIAN HEILMANN ET AL., CHINA’S POLITICAL SYSTEM 59–60, 76–
104 (Sebastian Heilmann ed., 2017). 
 12. See Countries, EUROPA, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/ 
countries_en (last visited Apr. 26, 2018); The EU in Brief, EUROPA, https:// 
europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_en (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
 13. For a discussion of how international organizations have impacted in-
ternational law, see JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-
MAKERS (2005). 
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plays in setting social and environmental standards for infra-
structure projects.14 
Legal institutions—meaning institutions that promulgate, 
administer, or enforce norms—are certainly among the govern-
mental units that operate at multiple levels. The typical multi-
level system has law-making bodies at more than one level. In 
India, for instance, in addition to the national parliament, each 
state has its own elected legislature and, at least in rural areas, 
up to three levels (district, intermediate, and village) of govern-
ment known as Panchayats.15 Considerable authority is de-
volved to the village-level Panchayats, which comprise elected 
assemblies.16 Laws are enforced and administered by police 
forces at the national and state levels, as well as administrative 
agencies at all of the levels.17 As for adjudication, India has a 
hierarchical judicial system with the Supreme Court situated 
above both the High Courts of the various states and District 
Courts.18 Relatively informal tribunals, known as lok adalats, 
also resolve disputes as part of a parallel system of dispute res-
olution.19 
What does it mean to measure the performance of one of 
these legal institutions? For the purposes of this Article, it 
means observing, evaluating, and reporting the extent to which 
the norms, capabilities, or actions of legal officials are either in-
trinsically desirable (for example, because they discourage tor-
ture of suspects) or tend to lead to desirable outcomes (such as 
 
 14. Benedict Kingsbury, Operational Policies of International Institutions 
as Part of the Law-Making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples, in 
THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 323, 325 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan 
Talmon eds., 1999); see also ALVAREZ, supra note 13, at 235–41. 
 15. See INDIA CONST. art. 243-O, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-
Third Amendment) Act, 1992; M. GOVINDA RAO & NIRVIKAR SINGH, POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF FEDERALISM IN INDIA 41–61, 93–119, 253–79 (2005). 
 16. INDIA CONST. art. 243-O, amended by The Constitution (Seventy-Third 
Amendment) Act, 1992; RAO & SINGH, supra note 15. 
 17. RAO & SINGH, supra note 15, at 111–14. 
 18. Id. at 105–11; Rakesh Kumar Shrivastava, UPDATE: A Guide to India’s 
Legal Research and Legal System, N.Y. UNIV. L. GLOBAL (Apr. 2014), http:// 
www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/India_Legal_Research1.html. 
 19. See Marc Galanter & Jayanth K. Krishnan, Debased Informalism: Lok 
Adalats and Legal Rights in Modern India, in BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: 
EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE RULE OF LAW 96, 108–10 (Erik G. Jensen & 
Thomas C. Heller eds., 2003). 
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reduced bribery or lower levels of pollution or, perhaps, in-
creased land values).20 This Article also assumes that perfor-
mance is reported in the form of an indicator: a collection of 
rank-ordered data that purports to capture a specified aspect of 
performance in a simple form.21 In other words, this Article fo-
cuses on legal indicators.  
Performance measures are of practical significance mainly 
because of how they influence the performance of legal officials. 
Influence in this context can mean either inducing officials to 
choose particular norms, capabilities, or actions, or replacing 
them with officials who will. One way of classifying the different 
channels of influence is in terms of the mechanisms through 
which they affect officials.22 Incentive-based mechanisms—
meaning those which attempt to induce desirable future behav-
ior by distributing rewards or punishments based on past per-
formance—obviously depend on performance evaluations. Sys-
tems that assign future governmental responsibilities for 
preventive reasons based on past performance might rely on per-
formance data. Other mechanisms of influence, such as peer 
pressure, rational persuasion, or government officials’ internal 
motivations, also may rely on performance data. 
Another way to classify the different channels through 
which performance measures influence the performance of legal 
 
 20. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & Shitong Qiao, Voice and Exit as Accounta-
bility Mechanisms: Can Foot-Voting Be Made Safe for the Chinese Communist 
Party?, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 158, 180–83 (2017) (arguing that land 
desirability is “influenced by local officials’ decisions about education, traffic 
regulation, crime control, and overall governmental efficiency, which are re-
flected . . . in real estate prices”). Land is not the only good whose value might 
be highly sensitive to performance of legal institutions. For instance, the prices 
of illicit drugs might be influenced by drug control laws and how they are en-
forced. See Jonathan P. Caulkins & Peter Reuter, How Drug Enforcement Af-
fects Drug Prices, 39 CRIME & JUST. 213 (2010). In theory, the prices of contracts 
that pay out when an illegal act occurs—for example a terrorist attack—could 
convey similar information about law enforcement, but such markets would cre-
ate perverse incentives. 
 21. See generally Kevin E. Davis et al., Indicators as a Technology of Global 
Governance, 46 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 71 (2012) (defining and analyzing indicators 
in the context of global governance); Davis, supra note 10. 
 22. Cf. WOUTER VAN DOOREN ET AL., PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT IN THE 
PUBLIC SECTOR 118–22 (2015) (classifying uses of performance information as 
learning, steering and control, and accountability and explaining that account-
ability for performance exerts reputational, market and political pressure on 
people in organizations); Gerhard Hammerschmid et al., Internal and External 
Use of Performance Information in Public Organizations: Results from an Inter-
national Survey, 33 PUB. MONEY & MGMT. 261, 262 (2013) (describing internal 
and external uses of performance information). 
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institutions is by distinguishing potential users of the 
measures.23 In democratic systems, the most obvious potential 
users are voters, who both incentivize good behavior and prevent 
bad behavior through their decisions at the ballot box. In hierar-
chical multilevel systems of government, officials at higher lev-
els of government use information about the performance of 
lower-level governments in deciding how to exercise their powers 
of oversight.24 Government officials’ peers might also rely on per-
formance data in deciding whether to deliver praise or criti-
cism.25 Self-motivated governments will use the same data to de-
termine whether and how to improve their performance.26 
Governments’ creditors might use fiscally-relevant performance 
data to assess creditworthiness.27 Last, but not least, prospective 
residents and investors trying to decide whether to submit them-
selves to the jurisdiction of a particular government—prospec-
 
 23. See generally VAN DOOREN ET AL., supra note 22, at 96–115 (describing 
public managers, politicians, members of Parliament, and citizens/customers as 
users of performance information).  
 24. See, e.g., Manuele Citi & Martin Rhodes, New Modes of Governance in 
the European Union: A Critical Survey and Analysis, in HANDBOOK OF EURO-
PEAN POLITICS 463, 466–67 (Knud Erik Jørgensen ed., 2007) (describing use of 
indicators to monitor European Union member states’ pursuit of objectives es-
tablished at the European level); Jie Gao, Pernicious Manipulation of Perfor-
mance Measures in China’s Cadre Evaluation System, 223 CHINA Q. 618 (2015) 
(documenting use of performance measures to motivate local officials by Chi-
nese central authorities as well as various ways of gaming of the measures); Jie 
Gao, Governing by Goals and Numbers: A Case Study in the Use of Performance 
Measurement to Build State Capacity in China, 29 PUB. ADMIN. & DEV. 21 
(2009) (documenting use of performance measures to motivate local officials by 
Chinese central authorities); Jonathan Zeitlin, Conclusion: The Open Method of 
Co-ordination in Action: Theoretical Promise, Empirical Realities, Reform Strat-
egy, in THE OPEN METHOD OF CO-ORDINATION IN ACTION: THE EUROPEAN EM-
PLOYMENT AND SOCIAL INCLUSION STRATEGIES 447 (Jonathan Zeitlin et al. eds., 
2005) (same).  
 25. See, e.g., Citi & Rhodes, supra note 24, at 469–72 (discussing peer re-
view and peer pressure within the European Union).  
 26. See, e.g., U. S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-14-747, MANAGING 
FOR RESULTS: AGENCIES’ TRENDS IN THE USE OF PERFORMANCE INFORMATION 
TO MAKE DECISIONS (2014) (presenting survey data on use of performance 
measures within US federal government agencies); VAN DOOREN ET AL., supra 
note 22 (use by public managers, politicians and members of Parliament); Pedro 
Rubim Borges Fortes, How Legal Indicators Influence A Justice System and 
Judicial Behavior: The Brazilian National Council of Justice and “Justice in 
Numbers,” 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 39 (2015) (describing use 
of performance measures by Brazil’s National Council of Justice).  
 27. Ruoying Chen, Preserving Decentralization with Chinese-Style Mar-
kets 10–11 (Mar. 5, 2017) (working paper) (on file with Minnesota Law Review).  
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tive residents whom government officials have incentives to at-
tract—might use data about past performance in order to predict 
future performance.28 
No matter how or by whom performance measures are used, 
there will be a premium on comparative data: data which permit 
a governmental unit to be analyzed in relation to either its own 
past performance or the performance of other units.29 By serving 
as a yardstick, comparative data can provide insight into the 
merits of outcomes that are difficult to evaluate in isolation.30 A 
New Yorker who has never been to Hong Kong might have no 
idea that it is possible for a subway system to be cleaner, safer, 
and more reliable than the New York subway system. Compara-
tive data can also help to evaluate governments’ actions. For in-
stance, a comparison of policing tactics and crime rates, whether 
over time or across jurisdictions, can be used to figure out which 
tactics work better than others—as well as which governments 
have chosen those actions. 
Different categories of potential users will tend to be inter-
ested in different types of performance measures. Members of 
the general public, such as voters and prospective residents, typ-
ically will have limited time or expertise to devote to analyzing 
governmental performance. Those users will tend to seek out in-
dicators that report relatively large quantities of information in 
a highly simplified form. The World Bank’s Ease of Doing Busi-
ness Index is a good example of a highly simplified measure, as 
it purports to use a single number to capture the performance of 
all the portions of the legal system that bear on the ease of doing 
business in an entire country.31 
 
 28. ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER 
GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 119–20 (2013) (discussing how mobile individuals 
and firms—“foot voters”—have incentives to shop around among governments 
for the best combination of public services); Hills & Qiao, supra note 20, 173–79 
(2015) (surveying literature on foot voters); Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of 
Public Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956) (seminal article arguing that 
governments respond to foot voters). 
 29. See Timothy Besley & Anne Case, Incumbent Behavior: Vote-Seeking, 
Tax-Setting, and Yardstick Competition, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 25, 25 (1995) (dis-
cussing “yardstick competition” and how comparative data works in politics); 
Pierre Salmon, Decentralisation as an Incentive Scheme, 3 OXFORD REV. ECON. 
POL’Y 24, 30–32 (1987) (discussing value of comparative data in evaluating per-
formance of governments). 
 30. Id. 
 31. Economy Rankings, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
rankings (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
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II.  EXISTING SUBNATIONAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES   
The focus of this Article is upon measures that can be used 
to evaluate the performance of individual legal institutions 
within multilevel systems of governance, particularly at the sub-
national level. There has been a proliferation of legal indicators 
since the turn of the 20th century. The best-known examples, 
however, report only a single score for each country, and there-
fore are obviously unsuitable for evaluating the performance of 
subnational institutions. Take for instance the World Bank’s 
Ease of Doing Business Index and the individual indicators used 
to construct it. The individual indicators measure the ability of 
domestic small and medium-size firms to complete eleven tasks, 
including registering a business or property, getting construc-
tion permits, enforcing contracts, and paying taxes.32 The focus 
is on measuring the time and cost required to complete the task, 
although for some tasks the indicators include measures of the 
quality of the applicable legal institutions.33 The Doing Business 
indicators used to calculate the Ease of Doing Business Index 
usually report only a single score for each country based on data 
pertaining to “the largest business city.”34 To be fair, however, 
in eleven of the larger countries (which include the United 
States) the indicators are based on the population-weighted av-
erage of data from the two largest business cities.35 
Another well-known legal indicator is the World Justice Pro-
ject (WJP) Rule of Law Index.36 The index is designed to measure 
“the rule of law as experienced by ordinary people.”37 It is based 
on data from two sources: (1) a survey of the general population 
in each country and; (2) a questionnaire sent to “in-country pro-
fessionals with expertise in civil and commercial law, criminal 
justice, labor law, and public health.”38 The population surveys 
 
 32. WORLD BANK GRP., supra note 3, at 13–14. 
 33. Id. at 14. 
 34. Id. at 13. 
 35. Id. at 168. 
 36. See WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2017–2018, https:// 
www.worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_ROLI_2017 
-18_Online-Edition_0.pdf.  
 37. Id. at 156. 
 38. Id. at 157. 
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are distributed in the three largest cities of each country, but the 
locations of the in-country professionals are not specified.39 
The Doing Business indicators and the WJP Rule of Law In-
dex at least specify which parts of each country are being por-
trayed. Other legal indicators are less transparent. For instance, 
the World Bank produces a set of six country-level indicators 
known as the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGIs).40 Sev-
eral of the dimensions of governance measured by these indica-
tors—namely, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and 
rule of law—appear to relate directly to the performance of legal 
institutions.41 These evaluations are undoubtedly influenced by 
both national and subnational governments. However, the pro-
ducers of the WGIs do not specify which subnational govern-
ments are portrayed by each source, almost certainly because 
they do not know. The WGIs are composite indicators based on 
over thirty underlying data sources, including surveys of house-
holds or firms, as well as assessments of experts.42 The firms and 
experts whose perceptions are captured are not always located 
inside the country being assessed.43 It is quite possible that dif-
ferent sources underlying the WGIs either measure perceptions 
of different subnational institutions—for example, courts which 
hear cases involving large foreign firms as opposed to small do-
mestic firms—or aggregate perceptions of multiple institutions. 
Under these circumstances, it is impossible for the producers of 
the WGIs to say which institutions their indicators portray. 
There are a few examples of multicountry indicators that re-
port scores for different locations in a single country.44 The most 
 
 39. Id. at 157–58 (stating that the population survey is a sample from 1000 
people in the “three largest cities of each country” while the in-country profes-
sionals are selected through directories and referrals and vetted by the World 
Justice Project). 
 40. Daniel Kaufmann et al., The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Meth-
odology and Analytical Issues, 3 HAGUE J. ON RULE L. 220, 220 (2011) (stating 
that the Worldwide Governance Indicators measure “six dimensions of govern-
ance”). 
 41. See id. at 239 (discussing the use of perception data). 
 42. WGI Data Sources, WORLD BANK GRP., http://info.worldbank.org/ 
governance/wgi/#doc-sources (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (stating “The WGI com-
pile and summarize information from over 30 existing data sources” including 
households, firms, and experts). 
 43. See Kevin E. Davis, What Can the Rule of Law Variable Tell Us About 
Rule of Law Reforms?, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 141, 150 (2004) (stating that some-
times certain indicators contain subjective assessments “made by individuals 
who are not necessarily resident[s] in the society to which their assessments 
pertain”). 
 44. See generally Mitton, supra note 8 (collecting datasets). 
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prominent indicators of this sort are actually produced by the 
World Bank’s Doing Business Project, alongside its country-level 
indicators. Since 2005, the Doing Business Project has produced 
subnational reports that cover 438 locations in sixty-five differ-
ent countries.45 These subnational reports typically cover three 
to six topics.46 They always include indicators for starting a busi-
ness, dealing with construction permits, and registering prop-
erty.47 The other indicators reported are: enforcing contracts, 
getting electricity, paying taxes, or trading across borders.48 Un-
like the country-level indicators, which are produced annually, 
the subnational Doing Business indicators for each country are 
produced at irregular intervals.49 
Indicators for subnational territories are also produced by 
domestic actors. In Brazil, Fundação Getulio Vargas, an educa-
tional institution, sponsors ICJBrasil, an indicator designed to 
measure public trust in the court system.50 ICJBrasil encom-
passes two subindicators: one which measures general percep-
tions of the court system and another which measures beliefs 
about how the courts will resolve specific types of disputes.51 The 
indicator is based on data from surveys of individuals living in 
the metropolitan areas of seven Brazilian states (Amazonas, Per-
nambuco, Bahia, Minas Gerais, Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo and 
Rio Grande do Sul), plus the Federal District, and the data are 
 
 45. See Subnational Reports, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness 
.org/reports/subnational-reports (last visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
 46. In India, seven topics were covered; “Closing a business” was added to 
the list of topics frequently covered in other subnational reports. See WORLD 
BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS IN INDIA 2009 1 (2009), http://www.doingbusiness 
.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Subnational-Reports/DB09-Sub 
-India.pdf.  
 47. See, e.g., WORLD BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS IN KAZAKHSTAN 2017 
at 4 tbl.1.1 (2017), http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/ 
DoingBusiness/Documents/Subnational-Reports/DB17-Sub-Kazakhstan.pdf. 
 48. See id. at 15 tbl.2.1. 
 49. There is nothing to prevent anyone from producing their own indicators 
using the Doing Business methodology. In 2016, the Jiangsu province in China 
“began to evaluate its 96 counties in 13 cities on their implementation of admin-
istrative reform and business environment in 2016, according to the ease of do-
ing business index set by the World Bank.” Premier Li Urges Nationwide Efforts 
to Deepen Administrative Reform, The BEIJING NEWS (May 29, 2017), http:// 
english.gov.cn/premier/news/2017/05/29/content_281475670291580.htm. 
 50. LUCIANA GROSS CUNHA ET AL., RELATÓRIO ICJBRASIL: 1º SEMESTRE 
2016 [Report ICJBrasil: First Half 2016] 2 (2016), http://bibliotecadigital.fgv.br/ 
dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/17204/Relatorio-ICJBrasil_1_sem_2016 
.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 
 51. Id. at 3.  
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reported separately for each state or district.52 Similar rule of 
law indicators are produced in China, including by a think tank 
called the China Rule of Law Research Institute.53 
Another important example of an indicator that covers sub-
national territories is Vietnam’s Provincial Competitiveness In-
dex, produced by the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Indus-
try together with the United States Agency for International 
Development.54 This index reports scores for each of Vietnam’s 
sixty-three provinces and municipalities.55 In addition to the 
overall competitiveness index, there are ten subindicators that 
cover both legal and non-legal topics.56 Some of the legally ori-
ented subindicators cover topics similar to those covered by the 
Doing Business indicators, including entry costs for new firms, 
access to land and security of tenure, and the amount of time 
devoted to complying with regulations or accommodating inspec-
tions.57 There are also indicators of overall confidence in legal 
institutions and bias in favor of state-owned entities.58 The indi-
cators are constructed using data from separate surveys of do-
mestic and foreign-owned firms in each province.59 
Virtually all of the performance measures described above 
rely on survey data. In principle, they could rely on data from 
other sources. Most notably, they could rely on official data, in-
cluding data derived from audits. A model might be the audits of 
Brazilian municipalities conducted by the Controladoria Geral 
da União (CGU), an agency of the federal government responsi-
ble for overseeing the use of public resources.60 Each year the 
 
 52. Id. at 4–5.  
 53. See China Rule of Law Government Index System Research Project, 
CHINA RULE OF LAW RESEARCH INST., http://www.ruleoflawchina.com/project 
-researches/china-rule-of-law-government-index-system-research-project (last 
visited Apr. 26, 2018). 
 54. EDMUND MALESKY ET AL., VIETNAM CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND IN-
DUSTRY & USAID, THE VIETNAM PROVINCIAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX 2016 
(2017). 
 55. Id. at 15. 
 56. Id. at 17 (listing indicators). 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. at 16 (stating that 10,037 domestic private firms and 1550 foreign 
firms responded to the PCI survey); see also Trang (Mae) Nguyen, Grading Reg-
ulators: The Impact of Global and Local Indicators on Vietnam’s Business Gov-
ernance, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2254, 2272–85 (2013) (discussing the impact of the 
Provincial Competitiveness Index). 
 60. See Claudio Ferraz & Frederico Finan, Exposing Corrupt Politicians: 
The Effects of Brazil’s Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes, 123 Q.J. 
ECON. 703, 707 (2008). 
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CGU audits the expenditures of several randomly selected mu-
nicipalities and publishes the results online.61 The CGU’s audits 
have been very effective in detecting waste and corruption, 
though not typically in connection with the operation of legal in-
stitutions.62 In India, “social audits” aimed at individual poverty 
alleviation programs are conducted in collaboration with non-
governmental organizations.63 There is no particular reason not 
to use comparable audits to obtain information about legal insti-
tutions. 
III.  THE CHALLENGES OF CREATING PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES FOR COMPLEX LEGAL SYSTEMS   
Although there are several examples of legal performance 
measures that cover subnational territories, they are not neces-
sarily good measures of the performance of any particular sub-
national legal institution. In fact, few of the existing measures 
adequately respond to the special challenges that arise in con-
structing performance measures for legal institutions in the con-
text of multilevel systems of governance. The remainder of this 
Part documents those challenges. 
A. TWO TYPES OF LEGAL PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
Legal performance measures can be divided into two broad 
categories: (1) those which measure legal institutions directly; 
and (2) those which measure outcomes likely to be influenced by 
legal institutions.64 Direct measures are those which report on 
issues such as: Does the law permit all kinds of commercial dis-
putes to be submitted to arbitration? How many judges are there 
at each level of court and what are their qualifications? Is a uni-
versity degree in architecture or engineering required for people 
responsible for reviewing building plans? What qualifications do 
those reviewers actually possess?65 Examples of outcome 
measures are: How long does it take to obtain a construction per-
mit? What percentage of firms report paying bribes to public of-
ficials? What proportion of violent criminals is apprehended by 
 
 61. Id.  
 62. See id. (looking at how publicly released audits have affected elections 
in Brazil). 
 63. See, e.g., Nidhi Vij, Collaborative Governance: Analysing Social Audits 
in MGNREGA in India, 42 IDS BULL. 28, 30–32 (2011). 
 64. Davis, supra note 10, at 39, 42. 
 65. Id. at 41–42.  
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the police? How many complaints are filed against the police? 
How good is air quality? 
These examples demonstrate that legal performance 
measures can relate to very different types of legal institutions 
and outcomes. Direct measures of legal institutions include 
measures pertaining to both legal norms (e.g., Does the law per-
mit . . . ?) and legal officials (e.g., How many judges are there?).66 
Similarly, some outcome measures focus on the behavior of legal 
officials while others focus on the behavior of nonlegal actors and 
still others, such as measures of bribery, capture what can only 
be described as joint behavior.67 
The Sections which follow discuss several challenges associ-
ated with each of our two broad categories of performance 
measures. Issues that relate exclusively to measures of specific 
types of legal institutions or legal outcomes are left for future 
analysis. 
B. MEASURES OF LEGAL INSTITUTIONS 
It often is relatively straightforward to generate measures 
that capture legal norms or the capabilities or actions of legal 
officials. This is especially true when the required information 
has already been recorded. Legal norms are frequently embodied 
in and recorded as statutes, regulations, or decrees. The number 
of legal officials and their educational qualifications are often 
recorded for administrative purposes.68 And the practices of li-
censing and enforcement agencies are often governed by written 
rules set out in handbooks, manuals, and guidelines.69 
Naturally, it is relatively difficult to produce performance 
measures based on categories of legal information that are not 
recorded. For instance, sometimes legal officials refer to written 
norms—statutes, regulations, guidelines, etc.—to decide what 
 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 43. 
 68. See, e.g., About California Courts, CAL. COURTS., http://www.courts.ca 
.gov/2113.htm (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (providing information about Califor-
nia courts); Judicial Directories, N.Y. COURTS, http://www.nycourts.gov/judges/ 
directory.shtml (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (providing information about judges 
of the New York State Unified Court System).  
 69. See generally Legal Division, CAL. DEP’T OF BUS. OVERSIGHT, http:// 
www.dbo.ca.gov/Laws_&_Regs/default.asp (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (detailing 
various guidelines and opinion letters for corporations and financial institutions 
in California); Private Investigator, N.Y. STATE, https://www.dos.ny.gov/ 
licensing/privateinvest/privatei.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (describing li-
censing requirements for private investigators in New York). 
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legal consequences to assign to a particular kind of behavior. 
However, on other occasions they make decisions on a case-by-
case basis or by referring to the norms implicit in past decisions. 
In fact, this is exactly how judges in common law systems are 
supposed to decide cases, and there are good reasons to believe 
that judges in civil law jurisdictions and other kinds of adjudica-
tors operate in the same way.70 It may be possible to extract the 
norms that explain past decisions and predict future decisions 
by going to the effort of reviewing large numbers of past deci-
sions, but, at least given the current state of technology, this re-
quires considerable effort. Moreover, the results of this kind of 
analysis are open to disagreement. An additional complication is 
that officials charged with licensing and enforcement may be re-
luctant to disclose information about their capabilities and prac-
tices in order to preserve strategic advantages over regulated ac-
tors. 
Leaving aside the practical issues associated with measur-
ing the characteristics of legal institutions, there is the challenge 
of knowing which characteristics ought to be measured. Is it de-
sirable, in any sense, to allow all sorts of commercial disputes to 
be submitted to arbitration? To insist that building plans be in-
spected by licensed architects or engineers? To assign judges to 
cases randomly rather than according to expertise? These sorts 
of legal norms, capabilities, and practices are only desirable to 
the extent they lead to desirable outcomes, not because they are 
intrinsically desirable. Consequently, the only way to determine 
whether they are good performance measures is to study 
whether they are correlated with desirable outcomes. Ulti-
mately, therefore, it is necessary to formulate outcome-based 
performance measures. 
C. MEASURES OF LEGAL OUTCOMES 
Measures that focus on outcomes only qualify as useful 
measures of the performance of specific legal institutions when 
it is clear which institutions are responsible for the outcomes in 
question. In particular, if the hope is that performance measures 
will promote desirable actions, governments should be given 
credit or assigned blame for outcomes caused by their actions, 
not for outcomes beyond their control. Discreditable actions that 
 
 70. JOHN MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADI-
TION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMER-
ICA 39–55 (3d ed. 2007) (comparing use of statutes and prior judicial decisions 
by judges in common law and civil law systems). 
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happen to coincide with desirable outcomes generally should not 
be encouraged, and vice versa.  
Identifying the institutions responsible for any given out-
come presents two challenges. First, it is necessary to determine 
whether any legal institutions at all influence the behavior in 
question. Second, when more than one institution has an impact, 
it is necessary to figure out the influence of each. We will focus 
here on the second of these challenges.71 
In the simplest possible world, each outcome would be 
linked to a single legal institution at a single level of govern-
ment. A world with multiple levels of government might satisfy 
this condition if the governments’ areas of responsibility are di-
vided into watertight compartments so that each is exclusively 
capable of influencing a specified set of outcomes. Imagine, for 
instance, a world in which the municipal government is respon-
sible for construction, the provincial government is responsible 
for security, and the national government is responsible for air 
pollution. Much of the literature on decentralization assumes 
that governmental functions are allocated in this fashion.72 
The real world often is more complex than this: outcomes 
are influenced by institutions located at multiple levels of gov-
ernment and variations in outcomes have to be explained by var-
iations in combinations of institutions. This frequently occurs in 
the case of laws that call for prior approval of an activity by pub-
lic officials. For example, registering a business may involve reg-
istration with a national agency and a permit from the municipal 
government. Multiple governments may also be involved in reg-
ulation that involves imposing sanctions after the fact. For in-
stance, laws enacted by one level of government might be en-
forced by other levels of government. Brazil is a case in point. 
Prohibitions found in national laws, such as anticorruption laws, 
can be investigated either by state or federal police forces, a va-
riety of independent agencies, or federal or state public prosecu-
tors.73 Those investigations can lead to administrative, civil, or 
 
 71. For a recent discussion of the first challenge, see LAWRENCE M. FRIED-
MAN, IMPACT: HOW LAW AFFECTS BEHAVIOR 1–6 (2016). 
 72. See Marcelin Joanis, Shared Accountability and Partial Decentraliza-
tion in Local Public Good Provision, 107 J. DEV. ECON. 28 (2014) (exploring the 
theoretical implications of blurred accountability); Mookherjee, supra note 9, at 
235 (noting that few empirical studies have examined the implications of par-
tially decentralized service provision). 
 73. See Mariana Mota Prado & Lindsey Carson, Brazilian Anti-Corruption 
Legislation and Its Enforcement: Potential Lessons for Institutional Design, 4 J. 
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criminal proceedings initiated by either an independent agency 
or the federal or state public prosecutor.74 Judicial proceedings 
can take place in either state or federal courts.75 In complex 
cases, it is not uncommon for multiple agencies to be involved, 
with varying levels of coordination.76 
The mere fact that outcomes are generated by multiple legal 
institutions does not necessarily mean that it is impossible to 
trace the roles of individual units. For any individual outcome, a 
sufficiently in-depth historical analysis might reveal its root 
causes—for example, which emissions standards are too lax, 
which government agency failed to inspect a factory’s pollution 
controls, or which court delayed the prosecution of an embez-
zler.77 This kind of analysis might be a practical way of identify-
ing the causes of small numbers of outcomes, but it quickly be-
comes impractical as the number of outcomes increases. 
With enough data, it is possible to compare the outcomes as-
sociated with different combinations of legal institutions and 
draw inferences about the roles of individual institutions. This 
kind of comparative analysis is especially straightforward when 
three conditions are satisfied. First, institutions’ areas of influ-
ence are defined exclusively in geographic terms. Second, each 
institution’s operations uniformly affect all of the people located 
within its territory. Third, in the case of multilevel systems, the 
areas of influence of several lower-level institutions are com-
pletely encompassed within the area of influence of the institu-
tion at the next higher level. When these conditions hold, all the 
outcomes in a given geographic area are influenced in the same 
way by the same combination of institutions. Furthermore, there 
 
SELF-GOVERNANCE & MGMT. ECON. 34, 47–49 (2016) (discussing institutional 
multiplicity in corruption investigations in Brazil). 
 74. See id. at 49–52.  
 75. See Lucas Dotto Borges et al., Bribery and Corruption 2018: Brazil, 
GLOBAL LEGAL INSIGHTS, https://www.globallegalinsights.com/practice-areas/ 
bribery-and-corruption-laws-and-regulations/brazil (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) 
(explaining that “[t]he judicial branch (divided into Federal and State jurisdic-
tions according to the nature of the matters being discussed) is formed by first 
instance courts, appellate courts, and Superior courts”). 
 76. See Prado & Carson, supra note 73 (discussing the various Brazilian 
institutions investigating corrupt actions). For a discussion of a particularly 
complex case, see Kevin E. Davis et al., Transnational Anticorruption Law in 
Action: Cases from Argentina and Brazil, 40 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 664 (2015). 
 77. On process tracing, see ALEXANDER L. GEORGE & ANDREW BENNETT, 
CASE STUDIES AND THEORY DEVELOPMENT IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 205–32 
(2004); David Collier, Understanding Process Tracing, 44 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 
823 (2011); James Mahoney, The Logic of Process Tracing Tests in the Social 
Sciences, 41 SOC. METHODS & RES. 570 (2012). 
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are contiguous areas in which outcomes are influenced by differ-
ent lower-level institutions but the same higher-level institu-
tions. As a result, comparisons of outcomes across contiguous ge-
ographic areas will reveal information about the impact of 
variations in lower-level institutions. So, for instance, one might 
conclude that even though the time it takes to start a business 
is influenced by both national and municipal governments, var-
iations across cities can be explained entirely by differences in 
the performance of the municipal governments since they are all 
influenced in the same way by the national government. 
Unfortunately, many real-world situations fail to satisfy the 
conditions necessary to make it possible to use inferences from 
comparisons across territorial units to identify the performance 
of specific legal institutions. The fundamental problem is that 
the scope of legal institutions need not be defined in territorial 
terms. The most obvious examples are laws that apply extrater-
ritorially.78 Prominent among these are laws on bribery of public 
officials. Virtually every country criminalizes, or has committed 
itself to criminalize, bribery of its public officials.79 In addition, 
a growing number of countries, including all of the members of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development 
(OECD), make it a criminal offense for their nationals to bribe a 
foreign public official, even when the offense is committed 
abroad.80 As a result, whenever a public official is bribed by a 
person that is the national of a foreign country that is a member 
of the OECD, at least two countries’ laws have been violated. 
 
 78. Other examples, not discussed in this Article, involve legal institutions 
which apply exclusively to actors within a specific territory but which regulate 
phenomena with extraterritorial effects, such as migratory species or pollutants 
that move across borders. Scholars have devoted considerable attention to de-
termining the appropriate geographic level at which to study and regulate these 
kinds of phenomena. See, e.g., ORAN R. YOUNG, THE INSTITUTIONAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE: FIT, INTERPLAY, AND SCALE (2003); David 
W. Cash et al., Scale and Cross-Scale Dynamics: Governance and Information 
in a Multilevel World, 11 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y 81 (2006). The discussion in the text 
also ignores the complications that can arise when multiple legal institutions 
operate collaboratively across territorial boundaries. See Donald P. Moynihan 
et al., Performance Regimes Amidst Governance Complexity, 21 J. PUB. ADMIN. 
RES. & THEORY, 141, 145–47 (2007) (describing challenge of formulating perfor-
mance measures for government agencies that engage in collaborative govern-
ance). 
 79. G.A. Res. 58/4, ch. 3, art. 15 (Oct. 31, 2003) (adopting the Convention 
against Corruption which requires the 183 state parties to criminalize bribery 
of national public officials). 
 80. This kind of legislation is required by international law. See Convention 
on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business 
Transactions, OECD, art. 4, Nov. 21, 1997. 
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This has to be taken into account when using data on the preva-
lence of bribery to assess the performance of anticorruption laws. 
Aside from laws that apply on the basis of nationality rather 
than territory, some laws apply exclusively to members of par-
ticular religious groups. India’s inheritance law is a prime exam-
ple: Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and Sikhs are subject to one law, 
while people of other religions, such as Muslims, Christians, Par-
sis, and Jews, are governed by other laws.81 As a result, it is im-
possible to measure, say, the restrictiveness of inheritance law 
at the country level.82 
Another type of complication arises when people can choose 
which legal institutions will govern their activities. Some gov-
ernments permit people located within their territory to subject 
themselves to legal institutions created by another government. 
For instance, within the United States or the European Union, 
business people have considerable freedom to choose which ju-
risdiction’s corporate laws will apply to their organization.83 
Similarly, in contractual relationships, parties regularly choose 
to have their relationship governed by the law of a major com-
mercial center such as New York State or England.84 Contract-
 
 81. See Hindu Succession Act, No. 30 of 1956, http://indiacode.nic.in (out-
lining application of the Act in Chapter 2). 
 82. Andrew Ellul et al., Inheritance Law and Investment in Family Firms, 
100 AM. ECON. REV. 2414, 2426 n.16 (2010) (analyzing the effect of inheritance 
law on corporate governance, but reporting that in some countries, inheritance 
law is too complex to capture in a simple indicator). 
 83. See Zoe Adams & Simon Deakin, Freedom of Establishment and Regu-
latory Competition, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF EUROPEAN UNION LAW 537, 
538 (Anthony Arnull & Damian Chalmers eds., 2015). For recent empirical stud-
ies, see Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory Competition and the Market 
for Corporate Law (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 528), https://ssrn 
.com/abstract=2685969 (describing the incorporation choices within the United 
States); Carsten Gerner-Beuerle et al., Why Do Businesses Incorporate in Other 
EU Member States? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Conflict of Laws Rules 
(ECGI, Working Paper No. 361/2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3012139 (dis-
cussing the incorporation choices within the European Union). 
 84. See Gilles Cuniberti, The International Market for Contracts: The Most 
Attractive Contract Laws, 34 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 455 (2014) (describing and 
explaining attractiveness of English and Swiss law among parties to interna-
tional agreements providing for arbitration); Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, The Flight to New York: An Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice 
of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. 
REV 1475 (2008) (finding that major commercial contracts frequently designate 
New York law and explaining why).  
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ing parties are often also able to choose to have any disputes re-
solved in the courts of a foreign state.85 
Even when it is possible to determine which government is 
responsible for governing a particular activity, it can be difficult 
to identify the specific legal institutions involved. Governments 
sometimes adopt legal norms that discriminate between sub-
jects. Important examples are national governments that estab-
lish special economic zones in which, for example, laws that per-
mit employees to unionize and strike are abrogated.86 National 
governments also sometimes create special legal regimes for for-
eign investors, either pursuant to the terms of investment agree-
ments with individual foreign firms, or by concluding an invest-
ment treaty with the firm’s home country.87 Higher-level 
governments can also adopt narrower types of discriminatory 
norms. For example, in China, the central government some-
times adopts legal reforms in selected pilot cities as a form of 
experimentation.88 A recent article argues that many of the re-
forms that led to the emergence of a market-based housing sys-
tem in urban areas started as experiments initiated by the cen-
tral government.89 
Even ostensibly neutral legal norms can have differential ef-
fects if they are not administered uniformly. For example, in 
Kenya, as of September 2015, the national Companies Law sets 
out the procedures required to start a business anywhere in the 
 
 85. See generally REGULATORY COMPETITION IN CONTRACT LAW AND DIS-
PUTE RESOLUTION 427–31 (Horst Eidenmüller ed., 2013).  
 86. See GOKHAN AKINCI & JAMES CRITTLE, SPECIAL ECONOMIC ZONES: 
PERFORMANCE, LESSONS LEARNED, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR ZONE DEVELOP-
MENT, FOREIGN INVESTMENT ADVISORY SERVICE 40 (2008), http://documents 
.worldbank.org/curated/en/343901468330977533/Special-economic-zone 
-performance-lessons-learned-and-implication-for-zone-development (describ-
ing labor standards issues documented by the International Labour Organiza-
tion and the International Confederation of Trade Unions).  
 87. See, e.g., Keith Molkner, A Comparison of the Legal Regimes for Foreign 
Investment in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyztan, 11 INT’L TAX & BUS. L. 71 
(1993) (providing an overview and comparison of legal regimes for foreign in-
vestment). 
 88. See Ciqi Mei & Zhilin Liu, Experiment-Based Policy Making or Con-
scious Policy Design? The Case of Urban Housing Reform in China, 47 POL’Y 
SCI. 321, 329 (2014). 
 89. See id. at 327–29 (2014). Other commentators suggest that these exper-
iments are driven by subnational governments. See, e.g., Chenggang Xu, The 
Fundamental Institutions of China’s Reforms and Development, 49 J. ECON. 
LIT. 1076, 1079 (2011). Xu also reports that each level of subnational govern-
ment negotiates performance targets with subordinate levels of government, 
implying that different subordinate governments might owe different obliga-
tions to the higher-level government. See id. at 1093. 
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country.90 Most aspects of the process are handled at the county 
level of government.91 According to the Doing Business subna-
tional report on Kenya, in 2015, variations in time and cost 
across counties were explained largely by differences across 
county-level agencies in the time required to obtain a business 
permit and the fees charged.92 Some of the variation was at-
tributable though to a national agency.93 The application to reg-
ister the company had to be submitted to the Registrar of Com-
panies, whose only office was in Nairobi.94 Submitting the 
application in person saved one to two weeks.95 As a result, the 
cost of company registration varied from county to county de-
pending on the cost of travel to Nairobi.96 
For all these reasons, the physical location of behavior is not 
necessarily an indication of which legal institutions have influ-
enced it. This means that comparisons of outcomes in different 
locations will not be a reliable way of isolating the influence of 
individual legal institutions. Variations in outcomes across loca-
tions might be caused by differences in the institutions nomi-
nally responsible for those locations, but they might also be 
caused by differences in the overall mix of applicable institutions 
that stem from extraterritorial regulation, voluntary choice of 
laws, or discriminatory treatment by common higher-level gov-
ernments. So, for instance, differences between cities in the time 
it takes to start a business might be explained either by differ-
ences between municipal governments or differences in national 
laws. Differences between provinces in how many firms report 
paying bribes might be explained by differences between provin-
cial governments in enforcement of antibribery laws or by differ-
ences in the proportions of firms subject to foreign antibribery 
laws that apply extraterritorially. 
 
 90. See WORLD BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS IN KENYA 2016 21 (2016), 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/ 
Subnational-Reports/DB16-Sub-Kenya.pdf. 
 91. See id. at 5.  
 92. See id. at 7. 
 93. See id. at 30. 
 94. See id. at 21. 
 95. See id. at 24. 
 96. See id. at 24–25. 
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IV.  THE MARKET FOR LEGAL PERFORMANCE 
MEASURES   
For all the reasons given in Part III above, it can be chal-
lenging to create performance measures for legal institutions 
that operate within multilevel systems of governance. In some 
cases, those challenges will be insurmountable, no matter how 
many resources are devoted to the task. In other cases, the ques-
tion is whether anyone will choose to invest the resources re-
quired to produce good performance measures. The next two Sec-
tions in this Part examine whether ordinary market forces, 
meaning the self-interested choices of private actors, will call 
good performance measures into existence. The final Section 
considers whether we should expect not-for-profit organizations 
or public actors to fill gaps in the market for legal performance 
measures. 
A. DEMAND FROM USERS OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
To understand whether self-interested actors will produce 
performance measures we have to begin by calculating the level 
of demand for those measures. Producers benefit to the extent 
they satisfy demand, so the level of demand will determine the 
strength of producers’ incentives. 
As noted in Part I, demand for legal performance measures 
can come from a variety of types of potential users. The list be-
gins with people interested in understanding how legal institu-
tions affect their lives, particularly as they make critical deci-
sions such as where to live, or whether, where and how to 
operate a business. Those people will be deeply interested in in-
formation about how long it takes to start a business, whether it 
is necessary to pay a bribe to obtain a building permit, or how 
safe the neighborhood is at night. In other words, they will be 
interested in information about the outcomes generated by gov-
ernments’ actions, including the outcomes associated with differ-
ent combinations of legal institutions.  
People who are motivated by these sorts of self-interested 
considerations will not necessarily need information that iso-
lates the contributions of specific legal institutions to the out-
comes about which they care. Why should a prospective entre-
preneur or resident care whether the national or the municipal 
government is responsible for regulating business entry, corrup-
tion, or preventing crime? In principle, information about the 
outcomes should be sufficient. Information about the perfor-
mance of specific legal institutions might be of practical value, 
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however, in predicting future outcomes. Suppose there is likely 
to be a change in the government of a province in which it re-
cently has been exceptionally easy to do business. Will the 
change in provincial government affect the business environ-
ment? To answer that question, it will be important to know 
whether past outcomes should be credited to the provincial gov-
ernment or the national government. 
Demand for measures of the performance of legal institu-
tions also comes from people who exercise authority over legal 
officials, namely, voters and officials at higher levels in the po-
litical hierarchy.97 These users will typically be interested in 
measures that isolate the performance of the specific legal insti-
tutions they oversee.98 Public officials’ peers also may be inter-
ested in monitoring their performance. For instance, police offic-
ers may monitor the performance of peers in neighboring 
jurisdictions for the purposes of benchmarking their own perfor-
mance, or as part of the process of identifying new people to re-
cruit or practices to adopt. They too will want fairly precise in-
formation about specific legal institutions. 
The total demand for legal performance measures will de-
pend on how valuable the information is to each potential user 
as well as the total number of users.99 The value to each user 
will depend on how informative the measure is relative to the 
person’s existing knowledge base. This will depend on several 
factors, including perceived accuracy, how frequently the meas-
ure has been used to score the performance of potentially inter-
esting institutions, and the identity of the producer.100 The value 
of accuracy is self-evident. The number of available scores is rel-
evant in cases where the indicator is being used for comparative 
purposes. The greater the number of scores, the greater the num-
ber of possible comparisons. Finally, it is likely that users of per-
formance measures will use the pedigree and reputation of the 
producer to draw inferences about the quality of the measures.101 
The value of institution-specific performance measures will 
depend on the availability of substitutes.102 In a pinch, users 
 
 97. See, e.g., Davis et al., supra note 21, at 92–95 (discussing how the Doing 
Business indicators are used in decision making).  
 98. See id.  
 99. See, e.g., KEVIN E. DAVIS & BENEDICT KINGSBURY, INDICATORS AS IN-
TERVENTIONS: PITFALLS AND PROSPECTS IN SUPPORTING DEVELOPMENT INITIA-
TIVES 17–18 (2011) (discussing determinants of the demand for indicators). 
 100. See id. at vii.  
 101. See id. at 27–29. 
 102. See id. at 28.  
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might be willing to extrapolate about the performance of an in-
stitution from what they know, or think they know, about the 
performance of similar institutions. This strategy will lead to 
large errors when members of the class of similar institutions 
vary widely in performance.103 For example, a businessperson 
considering an investment in Mexico might be perfectly happy to 
rely on the World Bank’s national indicators to estimate the ease 
of doing business in the country, on the theory that the varia-
tions within a country like Mexico are likely to be small in rela-
tion to the variations across countries. If the plan is to build a 
warehouse though, the national figure could be misleading. 
When it comes to obtaining a construction permit, in 2016, Co-
lima, a small state on the Pacific coast, performed on par with 
the best cities in the world while Mexico as a whole, whose rank-
ings were based on data from Mexico City and Monterrey, 
ranked eighty-seventh in the world.104 
Finally, the aggregate demand for a particular performance 
measure will increase with the number of users. That number 
will in turn depend on the number of people who are affected by 
the relevant institution, who are charged with its oversight, or 
who consider themselves members of its officials’ professional 
community. Among users motivated by self-interested consider-
ations, demand will be highest in relation to legal institutions 
that affect decisions with higher stakes. This generally means 
that demand will be highest for measures relating to influential 
institutions. As a corollary, at least among these self-interested 
users, the greater the number of institutions that influence a 
given decision, the less demand there will be for information 
about each individual institution.105 
Demand for performance measures will not necessarily 
translate into willingness to pay for them. Once released, scores 
on performance measures can be copied and shared at little ad-
ditional cost. Many potential users will be reluctant to pay for 
information when they can rely on cheap copies. This means that 
 
 103. See Richard Snyder, Scaling Down: The Subnational Comparative 
Method, 36 STUD. COMP. INT’L DEV. 93, 98 (2001) (discussing risks of “mean-
spirited analysis”). 
 104. See WORLD BANK GRP., DOING BUSINESS IN MEXICO 5 (2016); see also 
Ease of Doing Business in Mexico, DOING BUSINESS, http://www.doingbusiness 
.org/data/exploreeconomies/mexico (last visited Apr. 26, 2018).  
 105. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER R. BERRY, IMPERFECT UNION: REPRESENTATION 
AND TAXATION IN MULTILEVEL GOVERNMENTS 57–61 (2009) (explaining that 
most voters in multilevel governments have little incentive to pay attention to 
institutions with narrow policy functions). 
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from the perspective of potential profit-seeking producers, the 
effective demand for performance measures will be relatively 
low.  
B. SUPPLY OF PERFORMANCE MEASURES 
The next step in analyzing the market for legal performance 
measures is to consider the supply side of the equation. The pro-
duction process for these measures entails the following steps: 
(1) design or conceptualization of the measure; (2) collection of 
relevant data; (3) analysis of the data to generate scores; and (4) 
dissemination of the scores.106 Each of these steps is potentially 
costly. The costs include the time of the skilled professionals who 
design performance measures and analyze data; the expense re-
quired either to purchase data from existing sources or collect 
data directly from people familiar with the form or effects of legal 
institutions; and the expenses entailed in marketing and pub-
lishing any sort of informational product.107 
In many cases, it is reasonable to presume that the cost of 
producing a performance measure will be a fixed cost, meaning 
it will not vary with the value of the measure. To begin with, in 
general, the costs of designing and disseminating a performance 
measure seem unlikely to vary in relation to the influence or 
prominence of the institution being measured. Moreover, when 
it comes to data about legal institutions themselves, there is no 
particular reason to expect the costs of collecting data about cod-
ified norms and practices to vary with the influence or promi-
nence of the institution. Larger jurisdictions do not necessarily 
have longer laws: Indonesia has more than eight times the pop-
ulation of Malaysia, but Malaysia’s constitution is more than ten 
times as long as Indonesia’s.108 It is unlikely to cost more to read 
and code the Constitution of Indonesia than the Constitution of 
Malaysia. 
 
 106. See Kevin E. Davis et al., Introduction: The Local-Global Life of Indica-
tors: Law, Power, and Resistance, in THE QUIET POWER OF INDICATORS: MEAS-
URING GOVERNANCE, CORRUPTION, AND RULE OF LAW 1, 10–17 (Sally Engle 
Merry et al. eds., 2015). 
 107. See id. 
 108. Constitution Rankings, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONS PROJECT, http:// 
comparativeconstitutionsproject.org/ccp-rankings (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) 
(reporting the length of Indonesia’s and Malaysia’s constitutions as 5915 words 
and 64,080 words, respectively); Open Data: Population, WORLD BANK, https:// 
data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ID-MY&name_ 
desc=false (last visited Apr. 26, 2018) (reporting total populations of Indonesia 
and Malaysia in 2016 as 261,115,465 and 31,187,265, respectively). 
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The cost of collecting and analyzing data about either un-
codified practices or legal outcomes will typically depend, 
roughly, on the number of actions or outcomes to be measured. 
It is plausible, therefore, that the cost of data collection will be 
greater for measures of relatively influential institutions. In gen-
eral, the more actions or outcomes for which data must be col-
lected and analyzed, the greater are the costs.109 It is plausible, 
therefore, that the cost of data collection will be greater for 
measures of relatively influential institutions. The costs of data 
collection do not, however, necessarily rise in proportion to the 
number of outcomes. For example, the cost of obtaining survey 
data about the prevalence of bribery increases with the size of 
the relevant population because the larger the population, the 
larger the sample required to estimate the prevalence of bribery 
with a given level of confidence. However, the size of the required 
sample does not necessarily increase in proportion to the size of 
the population. For instance, a sample of seven hundred people 
may be required to obtain a satisfactory estimate of the mean 
outcome for a population of five million people, while a sample of 
one thousand people is required for a population of ten million 
people. The situation might be different, however if the larger 
population is also more heterogeneous and it is important to 
measure not only typical outcomes but how outcomes vary 
within the population.110 
To the extent data are analyzed with the aid of computers, 
the incremental costs of analyzing additional data may be 
small.111 Again though, if the outcomes are heterogeneous, a 
larger dataset will require more effort to analyze. The key factor 
in determining costs is likely to be heterogeneity among the in-
stitutions to be measured. 
For all these reasons, producers who try to produce the most 
valuable performance measures at the lowest cost typically will 
find it attractive to supply measures relating to relatively influ-
ential legal institutions, meaning those which affect large num-
bers of people or activities in a significant and similar way. The 
aggregate value of these measures will be relatively high, and 
their costs of production may not be significantly higher than the 
 
 109. This is true to the extent that data are collected through interviews or 
surveys, since these methods of data collection require effort on the part of each 
respondent, and sometimes an interviewer as well. See FLOYD J. FOWLER, SUR-
VEY RESEARCH METHODS 69–85 (4th ed. 2009) (describing costs per respondent 
for different modes of survey research).  
 110. See Snyder, supra note 103, at 94. 
 111. See Davis et al., supra note 21, at 85. 
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costs of producing measures of other institutions. This suggests 
that market forces will not lead to the production of performance 
measures for institutions at the lowest level of multilevel gov-
ernance. And even when low-level institutions are measured, 
only the most influential and prominent examples might be cov-
ered, because potential users are willing to extrapolate from the 
performance of a small number of institutions to estimate the 
performance of similar institutions. 
C. NOT-FOR-PROFIT AND PUBLIC ACTORS 
So far, we have considered whether self-interested profit-
maximizing actors are likely to produce legal performance 
measures. These are not the only possible providers. In fact, not-
for-profit organizations or public sector entities play a role in 
producing most existing measures of the performance of legal in-
stitutions.112 The World Bank (which produces the Doing Busi-
ness reports) is an international organization; Fundação Getulio 
Vargas (which produces ICJBrasil) is a private foundation;113 
and the Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and United States 
Agency for International Development (which produce the Pro-
vincial Competitiveness Index) are, respectively, a not-for-profit 
trade association and a government agency.114 These kinds of 
entities might be motivated by concern for public welfare, or the 
desire to promote themselves, but typically they are not con-
cerned with maximizing profits. Without the intervention of 
these sorts of actors it is unclear whether any performance 
measures for subnational institutions would ever be produced. 
  CONCLUSION   
Performance measures are important tools for maintaining 
and enhancing the performance of legal institutions. Through a 
variety of channels, including voting, incentive-based pay, and 
meritocratic hiring processes, performance measures can be 
used either to induce officials to do good work or to replace them 
with officials who will. In most contexts, comparative measures 
 
 112. For an analysis of entities playing a role in producing performance 
measures, see Tim Büthe, Beyond Supply and Demand: A Political-Economic 
Conceptual Model, in GOVERNANCE BY INDICATORS: GLOBAL POWER THROUGH 
QUANTIFICATION AND RANKINGS 29, 37–40 (Kevin E. Davis et al. eds., 2012). 
 113. See Mission and History of FGV, FGV, http://portal.fgv.br/en/ 
institutional# (last visited Apr. 26, 2018).  
 114. See PROVINCIAL COMPETITIVENESS INDEX, http://eng.pcivietnam.org 
(last visited Apr. 26, 2018).  
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that compress large amounts of data into a single indicator are 
likely to be particularly valuable. 
Most existing legal performance measures are legal indica-
tors that drastically simplify at least one aspect of the phenom-
enon they measure: they ignore the fact that legal institutions 
typically operate within multilevel systems of governance that 
comprise multiple legal institutions at each level. Many indica-
tors purport to measure the performance of legal institutions at 
the national level of government, but few either consider how 
national institutions’ performance is affected by subnational in-
stitutions or purport to measure the performance of subnational 
institutions themselves. 
This lacuna in the existing set of legal indicators is an im-
portant shortcoming. In order to realize their potential value, le-
gal performance measures must isolate the performance of indi-
vidual legal institutions within systems of governance that 
involve multiple legal institutions. It is often difficult to create 
these sorts of performance measures, especially if they depend 
on evaluations of social or economic outcomes generated by the 
relevant institutions. The main challenge arises in matching 
specific legal institutions with specific outcomes. Contrary to 
popular belief, there is no straightforward correspondence be-
tween physical location and the applicable set of laws. The scope 
of some laws is determined—either in whole or in part—by non-
territorial factors such as nationality, religion, or consent, and 
even within their ostensible scope of application laws might be 
applied unevenly. 
Even when it is possible to create adequate legal perfor-
mance measures there is no guarantee that they will come into 
existence through the operation of ordinary market forces. On 
one side of the market, the demand for performance measures 
can be large. Voters, investors, creditors, supervisors, peers—all 
have reason to value information about the performance of legal 
institutions. Demand is likely to be particularly high for 
measures relating to institutions that affect large numbers of 
people or very valuable activities. Turning to the supply side of 
the market, the costs of producing measures for these highly in-
fluential institutions are likely to be similar to those of produc-
ing measures for less influential institutions. This means that 
profit-oriented producers will tend to focus on creating measures 
for the more influential institutions. However, the demand for 
measures of less influential institutions will be satisfied only by 
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not-for-profits or public actors, which means that there is no 
guarantee that demand will be satisfied at all. 
The upshot of this analysis is that the potential producers 
may be either unable or unwilling to supply performance 
measures for certain legal institutions. This conclusion has sig-
nificant implications for debates about the performance implica-
tions of alternative forms of multilevel governance, which in turn 
bear on important questions of institutional design. In legal con-
texts, the classic debates revolve around the distribution of pow-
ers among supranational, federal, state, and municipal institu-
tions. It is well understood that the performance of various 
institutions will depend in part on the availability of mecha-
nisms for holding them accountable. Now we can see that their 
performance will also depend on the availability of performance 
measures. 
Finally, this discussion also has implications for the bur-
geoning literature on the production and use of legal indica-
tors.115 It suggests that greater attention ought to be paid to the 
special challenges associated with producing legal indicators 
that capture the performance of legal institutions within multi-
level systems of governance. 
 
 
 115. See generally Davis, supra note 10 (surveying the literature on the pro-
duction and use of legal indicators). 
